This paper compares stable Nash equilibria of two games of trade liberalization. In the FTA game, each country can form an FTA with either one of its trade partners, or both of them, or none of them. By contrast, in the No FTA game, each country must choose either no agreement or free trade. Under symmetry, free trade is uniquely stable under the No FTA game whereas the FTA game also admits a bilateral FTA as an equilibrium. However, there exist patterns of cost asymmetry for which the freedom to pursue bilateral FTAs is necessary for achieving global free trade.
Introduction
By their very nature, preferential trade agreements (PTAs) require member countries to grant tari¤ reductions to each other that are typically not extended to non-members. Ever since Jacob Viner's (1950) classic analysis, the static distortions created by such preferential trade liberalization have received signi…cant attention from economists and policy-makers alike.
Furthermore, in recent years there has been widespread concern regarding the potential adverse e¤ects of PTAs on the process of multilateral trade liberalization -the raison d'etre of the World Trade Organization (WTO).
This concern appears to be rather well-founded: so widespread are PTAs today that Mongolia is the only country in the world that does not belong to one. As per the WTO's web-site, over 200 PTAs are o¢cially in force today and their number is expected to reach 400 by 2010. Furthermore, such arrangements have spread rather rapidly in the last decade or so: since 1996, as many as 150 new PTAs have come into existence. Under the intricate and ever-increasing web of PTAs, the notion of most favored nation (MFN) treatment has begun to appear more of an exception rather than a core rule of the WTO.
The two most commonly occurring PTAs are free trade agreements (FTAs) and customs unions, with over 80% them being FTAs (Crawford and Fiorentino, 2005) . Accordingly, this paper focuses on FTAs and asks:
how does the pursuit of FTAs interact with the process of multilateral trade liberalization? Would global free trade be easier to achieve if countries were to pursue trade liberalization only multilaterally? Or as Jagdish Bhagwati (1991) put it -are FTAs building or stumbling blocs for multilateral trade liberalization? While the meaning of the phrase 'stumbling bloc' is relatively clear, what does the phrase 'building bloc' precisely mean? Does it mean that the process of bilateral trade liberalization eventually converges to multilateral free trade (as in Furusawa and Konishi (2007) and Goyal and Joshi (2006) )? Or does it mean that FTAs lay the foundation for multilateral trade liberalization in the sense that the freedom to pursue FTAs is necessary to attain global free trade? Existing literature has often tended to take the view that FTAs are building blocs so long as their pursuit does not prevent or eventually leads to the obtainment of global free trade. We take this argument one step further and show that there exist circumstances where global free trade is an equilibrium only if countries are free to form bilateral FTAs. When such is the case, we say that FTAs act as strong building blocs. To our knowledge, with the exception of Aghion et. al. (2007) , this potential role of FTAs has been overlooked by the voluminous existing literature on the subject. The reason for this is easy to see -as we explain below, only a model in which both bilateral and multilateral negotiations are endogenous can lead to such an insight.
The general idea behind our strong building bloc result can be stated as follows. If bilateral FTAs are prohibited by multilateral rules (or infeasible due to some other reasons) and the choice is only between multilateral free trade or no agreement (i.e. the status quo), any single country can ensure that the status quo prevails by simply opting to not practise free trade itself.
However, when the rest of the world is free to form bilateral FTAs, a country that makes such a choice can …nd itself immiserized relative to the status quo if the other countries choose to undertake preferential trade liberalization amongst themselves. 1 Anticipating this outcome, it may then become quite willing to undertake multilateral trade liberalization. Thus, the possibility of preferential trade liberalization amongst others can induce a country to participate in multilateral trade liberalization. While we demonstrate the strong building bloc result in the oligopoly model of intraindustry trade (described in greater detail below), it is clear that the mechanism underlying it is not model speci…c and is likely to arise in most existing models of international trade.
Formally, we analyze the coalition proof Nash equilibria (also called stable equilibria) of two games of trade liberalization between three countries. 2 1 See Chang and Winters (2002) for detailed evidence showing that the formation of the Latin American customs union MERCOSUR adversely a¤ected non-member countries by lowering the prices of their exports to MERCOSUR. 2 Our terminology follows Dutta and Mutuswami (1997) .
3 Under the FTA game, countries can pursue either bilateral, multilateral, or no trade liberalization whereas under the No FTA game, they have only the latter two options. It is worth noting that under the FTA game each country is free to pursue multiple FTAs -this is important because, on average, each country today belongs to six PTAs (World Bank, 2005) . Our underlying framework is one of intraindustry trade under oligopoly where the production cost of the oligopolistic good can di¤er across countries (see Brander and Krugman, 1983 Krishna (1998) . Both Furusawa and Konishi (2007) and Goyal and Joshi (2006) apply the network formation game of Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) to examine whether or not a given trade con…guration is pairwise stable. 3 Under symmetry, they …nd that the continued formation of bilateral FTAs leads to global free trade. However, while they examine whether or not bilateralism results in global free trade, they do not consider the consequences of adopting a strictly multilateral approach to global trade negotiations, a comparison that is central to our paper. As a result, they do not address the issue of when and why countries choose to pursue bilateral trade liberalization when multilateral trade liberalization is an option, an issue that lies at the heart of the complex relationship between the two types of liberalization.
Using a three-country version of the Brander-Krugman model (also utilized 3 Relative to our approach, the concept of pairwise stability implies two constraints. First, the deviating coalition can contain at most two countries. Second, a deviation can consist of severing just one existing link or forming one additional link. In order to eliminate these constraints, we follow Dutta and Mutuswami (1997) and use the concept of coalition proof Nash equilibrium to isolate stable equilibria. by us), Krishna (1998) has shown that the formation of an FTA between two countries reduces their incentives to liberalize trade with respect to the third country. However, in a model with endogenous tari¤s, Ornelas (2005a) shows that an FTA induces member countries to lower their tari¤s on the non-member country (which in turn reduces its incentive to participate in multilateral trade liberalization). Unlike us, Krishna (1998) and Ornelas (2005a) do not develop an equilibrium theory of FTAs and instead consider the e¤ects of an exogenously given FTA. 4 Our conceptual approach is related to that of Aghion et. al. (2007) who examine a leading country's choice between sequential and multilateral bargaining of free trade agreements. Like us, Aghion et. al. (2007) also identify building and stumbling bloc e¤ects of FTAs. However, there are important di¤erences between their approach and ours. First, in our model, all countries are free to negotiate FTAs and not just a single leading country. 5 Also, countries are free to form a pair of bilateral FTAs in our model and are not required to choose between joining a single grand coalition or staying out. Second, our analysis complements theirs in two important respects (i) we assume that governments care aggregate social welfare whereas their examples illustrating the e¤ects of FTAs assume governments care only about producer surplus and (ii) unlike them but like Grossman and Helpman (1995), we do not allow transfers between di¤erent coalitions. 6 Point (ii) is important because when transfers are possible and 4 Ornelas (2005b) provides an analysis of political economy considerations that arise in the context of FTAs. 5 Aghion et. al. (2007) do consider extensions where the leadership role is assigned to other countries if the …rst leader's o¤er is not accepted by the followers but they focus on deriving necessary conditions for a free trade equilibrium. 6 Grossman and Helpman (1995) point out that transfers are rarely used in trade agreements and when used they are limited in scope. However, Aghion et. al. (2007) note that the exchange of concessions on non-trade-related issues among FTA members can be viewed as transfers. Both arguments capture certain aspects of reality. Since one of our goals is to provide a non-cooperative theory of FTA formation in a game with non-transferable utility, we proceed with the assumption of no transfers. In this context, it is noteworthy that Raimondos-Møller and Woodland (2006) have shown that if non-discriminatory tari¤ reforms by a subset of countries are accompanied by appropriate income transfers between them, reforming members can make themselves strictly better 6 there is grand coalition superadditivity, in the absence of externalities free trade necessarily emerges in equilibrium regardless of whether the leading country chooses a sequential or multilateral approach. 7 In our model, even when free trade is Pareto optimal (as it is under symmetry), a bilateral FTA can emerge in equilibrium.
Our model is also related to that of Riezman (1999) who asks whether the option to pursue FTAs facilitates or hinders the achievement of free trade.
However, while we analytically derive the coalition proof Nash equilibria of two non-cooperative games, Riezman (1999) Second, our model allows us to focus on asymmetries between countries in a way that cannot be done in the inter-industry trade framework utilized by Riezman (1999) . As has already been noted, cost asymmetry between countries plays a crucial role in determining conditions under FTAs act as partial and strong building blocs. In this context, it is worth noting that both Krugman (1991) and Grossman and Helpman (1995) pointed out that asymmetries across countries could play an important role in determining the relationship between bilateral and multilateral trade liberalization.
The e¤ects of free trade agreements have also been analyzed in models of repeated interaction between countries that require multilateral cooperation to be self-enforcing -see Bagwell and Staiger (1997) , Bond and Syropoulos (1996) , Conconi and Perroni (2003) , Freund (2000) , and Saggi (2006) .
We add value to this literature by treating both bilateral and multilateral liberalization as endogenous. Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare (1998) provide a completely di¤erent perspective on international trade agreements by showing that, in the presence of domestic protectionist pressures, such agreements o¤ without having an adverse e¤ect on non-members. 7 Grand coalition superadditivity holds if the joint payo¤ of the three countries is larger under free trade than under no FTAs whatsoever or a bilateral FTA between any two countries. When this condition fails, Aghion et. al. (2007) show that the nature of externalities created by FTAs assumes a crucial role: when such externalities are negative, FTAs necessarily facilitate the achievement of global free trade whereas when they are positive, they hamper it. In our model, a bilateral FTA necessarily generates a negative externality for the non-member. 7 can improve the domestic allocation of resources by helping a government credibly commit to free trade. 8 
Model
There are three countries (a; b; c) and two goods: x and y. Preferences over the two goods are quasilinear: U (x; y) = u(x) + y. Good x is produced by a single pro…t-maximizing …rm in each country at a constant marginal cost in terms of the numeraire good y. 9 Firms compete in quantities and make independent decisions regarding how much to sell in each market (i.e. markets are segmented as in Brander and Krugman, 1983 ).
Production and trade
Due to market segmentation, it is su¢cient to focus on only one country's market. Let t denote a country's tari¤ on a trading partner with whom it does not have an FTA. In other words, under no agreement (i.e. the status quo) each country imposes the tari¤ t on both its trading partners whereas if it has an FTA with both of them it practises free trade. As Grossman and Helpman (1995) note, GATT Article XXIV forbids FTA members from raising their tari¤s on non-members. Accordingly, like Duttagupta and Panagariya (2006) we assume that FTA members retain their status quo tari¤ t on the non-member.
We now describe production and trade under no agreement. Firm j's e¤ective marginal cost of exporting equals j + t where j 0 equals its marginal cost of production for good x. By assumption, countries impose no taxes on local …rms and the numeraire good that may be traded internationally in order to balance trade. 8 In a recent paper, Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare (2007) build a model of trade agreements that integrates the terms of trade motive for FTAs emphasized by Bagwell and Staiger (1997) with the commitment argument analyzed in Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare (1998). 9 The monopoly assumption is not necessary. We just need …rms to have market power in order to justify the existence of tari¤s in a welfare-maximizing framework. Let x ji denote country j's exports to country i; x ii the sales of …rm i in country i; and x i = x ii + X j x ji denote total sales of good x in country i.
Country j's pro…t function for exports to country i, denoted by ji , can be written as:
First order conditions (FOCs) for pro…t maximization for exporters are
The above FOCs together with an analogous condition for the local …rm (i.e. p i + p 0 i x ii = i ) determine the equilibrium output levels of all …rms. Summing the FOCs for all …rms in country i gives
Following Bergstrom and Varian (1985) , if the left hand side is decreasing in
then total industry output sold in country i depends only on the sum of the (tari¤ included) marginal costs of production of all …rms. Assume this property holds so that we have:
In addition, the following comparative statics are also assumed to hold: 10
In other words, an increase in the tari¤ rate (t) lowers country j's exports to county i (x ji ) while it increases the sales of its local …rm (x ii ).
Welfare of country i is de…ned as the sum of its domestic surplus and total export pro…ts:
1 0 As is well known, if second order conditions for pro…t maximization hold these comparative statics obtain when the Cournot Nash equilibrium is stable and output levels of …rms are strategic substitutes. Since these results are well known, it is convenient to directly assume that the comparative statics in (5) hold. 9 where domestic surplus S i is de…ned as
where u(x i ) p i x i is consumer surplus in country i; ii = (p i i )x ii equals …rm i's pro…ts in its own market; t X j x ji equals country i's tari¤ revenue;
welfare is de…ned the sum of the welfare of individual countries:
Since the formation of FTAs results in the elimination of some of the tari¤s, in what follows in functions S(:) and W (:) we list the tari¤s faced by foreign countries in ascending alphabetical order. Also, in the export pro…t function ij (:), the …rst argument is the tari¤ faced by country i while the second argument is the tari¤ faced by its rival exporter (i.e. country k).
As is well known from the work of Brander and Spencer (1984) , under fairly general conditions each country has a unilateral incentive to impose rent extracting tari¤s on its trading partners (unless it commits not to do so via an FTA). Accordingly, we assume that the following holds:
i.e. domestic surplus of each country is highest under no agreement and lowest when it practises free trade. Since countries are asymmetric, a com-
Let T be the set of all feasible trade policy regimes: T = fhf gi; hfabgi; hfacgi; hfbcgi; hfab; acgi; hfab; bcgi; hfac; bcgi, or hfF gig where hf gi denotes the status quo and and hfF gi denotes global free trade.
Let r and v be any two elements of T . Further, let w i (r) denote country i's welfare and ww(r) denote world welfare under regime r. Note that small letters denote functions of trade regimes whereas capital letters denote functions of tari¤s that prevail during those regimes. For example, country i's welfare under the FTA hfijgi can be written either as w i (ij) or as W i (0; t).
Similar notation applies to domestic surplus and export pro…t functions.
De…ne w i (r v) as the di¤erence between country i's welfare under regimes r and v:
As is well known, under Cournot competition, the higher a country's cost of producing good x, the smaller its volume of exports and the larger its volume of imports (of this good). Given this and Grossman and Helpman's (1995) argument that an FTA is more likely to obtain when trade between potential partners is relatively balanced, we make the following assumption:
where m is an FTA partner of country i under regime r (but not regime v).
To get further insight behind assumption 2, consider regimes hf gi and hfijgi from country i's perspective. The intuition underlying @ w i (ij ) @ i 0 is as follows. Because of their larger volume of imports, higher cost countries have relatively more to gain from using tari¤s. Similarly, due to the smaller volume of their exports, higher cost countries have less to lose from other countries' tari¤s. As a result, a country's willingness to enter into a bilateral FTA with another depends negatively on its own cost.
A similar intuition underlies @ w i (ij ) @ j 0. The higher the production cost of its trading partner, the larger the increase in export pro…ts enjoyed by a country due to the trade liberalization undertaken by its partner and the smaller the loss in local pro…ts su¤ered by the domestic …rm due to its own trade liberalization.
Endogenous Free Trade Agreements
Consider the following two stage game of bilateral trade liberalization (called the FTA game). In the …rst stage, each country announces whether or not it wants to form an FTA with each of its trading partners (country i's announcement is denoted by i ). Next, given tari¤s, …rms compete in product markets. As is clear from the structure of the FTA game, an FTA member can sign an independent FTA with the non-member without needing consent of the other member.
A country's strategy set consists of four possible announcements. Country i's strategy set F i is:
where f ; g is an announcement in favor of no agreement with either of its trade partners. In order to conserve notation, each trade policy regime is denoted as follows: (i ) No agreement hf gi is maintained when no two announcements match or when everyone announces f ; g; (ii ) an FTA between countries i and j denoted by hfijgi is formed i¤ they both announce each other's name j i and i j ; (iii ) two independent bilateral FTAs hfij; ikgi in which i is the common member are formed i¤ (1) j i and i j and (2) k i and i k ; and (iv ) free trade hfF gi obtains i¤ all countries announce each others' names: i.e. a = fb; cg, b = fa; cg, and c = fa; bg. It is worth noting here that the regime under which there exist two independent bilateral FTAs (i.e. hfij; ikgi) can be viewed as a 'hub and spoke' trading arrangement where the common member (i.e. country i) is the hub while each of the other two countries (i.e. countries j and k) is a spoke. Also note that two di¤erent strategy vectors may yield the same agreement(s) when countries' announcements do not match. For example, consider the following announcements:
The above strategy vector gives rise to two independent FTAs hfab; bcgi of which country b is the common member. But the same outcome obtains when the strategy vector is given by:
Here, even though country a announces country c, country c wants to form an FTA only with country b. 11 In order to eliminate redundant announcements, assume that each FTA announcement costs " (where " > 0 is arbitrarily small).
Our method of analysis is to compare the FTA game with the following game of multilateral trade liberalization (called the No FTA game). In the …rst stage of the No FTA game, each country announces either in favor of or against free trade. If all countries announce in favor, free trade emerges.
If not, the status quo prevails. Next, …rms compete in the product market.
Clearly, the No FTA game restricts the strategy set of country i to i = ff ; g; fj; kgg, j 6 = k 6 = i. We compare the equilibria of these two games of trade liberalization to determine how the freedom to pursue bilateral FTAs a¤ects the likelihood of obtaining global free trade.
As might be expected, both games admit multiple Nash equilibria. To deal with this multiplicity and to capture the process of FTA formation in a more realistic fashion, we focus attention on Nash equilibria that are immune to self-enforcing coalitional deviations (i.e. are coalition proof or stable). 12 It is useful to note that in the No FTA game, a unilateral deviation from free trade by any country reverts everyone back to no agreement whereas in the FTA game the same deviation results in the deviating country becoming either (i) a non-member country under an FTA between the other two countries or (ii) a spoke under a pair of bilateral FTAs. Since the welfare of a country under these trade policy regimes can be lower/higher 1 1 Note that under our approach, the formation of a bilateral FTA requires consent from both sides. This is in contrast to the open membership rule analyzed by Yi (1996) where existing members cannot prevent others from joining. 1 2 See Bernheim et. al. (1987) for the formal de…nition of a coalition proof Nash equilibrium. 13 than its welfare under no agreement, it is not immediately obvious under which game the unilateral incentive to deviate from free trade is stronger.
Thus, even though the set of possible deviations from free trade under the No FTA game is a strict subset of those under the FTA game, it does not follow that free trade is more likely to be a stable equilibrium of the No FTA game.
The analysis proceeds as follows. First, we show that trade liberalization of any kind is desirable under symmetry so that free trade yields higher world welfare than any other policy regime (Lemma 1). We then derive Nash equilibria of the two games (Proposition 1 and 2). Next, we show that when countries are symmetric, free trade is the unique stable equilibrium of the 
Equilibrium FTAs under symmetry
Through-out this section, we assume that the cost of producing good x is equal across countries: i = for all i. It proves convenient to begin with the e¤ects of FTAs on global welfare.
Trade liberalization and welfare
We show in the appendix that a reduction in any country's tari¤(s) (whether on a preferential or a non-discriminatory basis) increases aggregate world welfare. This implies the following: The intuition behind this result is simple: when all countries have the same cost of production, the allocation of output across countries is immaterial and any trade restrictions (whether preferential or multilateral) simply lower aggregate world output and therefore welfare. Since any tari¤ creates a deadweight loss, rent extraction by an importing country is more than o¤set by the loss in pro…ts of exporters.
Nash equilibria
Before deriving (subgame perfect) Nash equilibria of the two games, we clarify an expositional point: while changes in the underlying trade regime result from announcement deviations by countries, it proves more convenient to refer directly to regime changes rather than changes in announcements. For example, when the bilateral FTA hfijgi is in place, the unilateral announcement deviation of country i from fj; g to f ; g alters the underlying trade regime from hfijgi to no agreement hf gi and we refer to this announcement deviation of country i as simply a deviation from hfijgi to hf gi.
It is clear that no agreement hf gi is a Nash equilibrium of the No FTA game since no country has a unilateral incentive to announce another country's name if the latter does not announce its name in return. Furthermore, symmetry implies that under no agreement hf gi, welfare of all countries is equal. Clearly, the same is true under free trade hfF gi. Since world welfare is higher under hfF gi than under hf gi (Lemma 1), it follows that each country is better o¤ under hfF gi than under hf gi. As a result, under symmetry no country has a unilateral incentive to deviate from free trade since any other announcement on its part leads to no agreement where it (and everyone else) is worse o¤:
Proposition 1: Under symmetry, no agreement hf gi and free trade hfF gi are both Nash equilibria of the No FTA game.
The following two conditions prove useful in describing the Nash equilibria of the FTA game:
i.e. if condition 1 holds, each country prefers to be a non-member under a bilateral FTA to being a spoke under a pair of bilateral FTAs.
Condition 1 can be understood as follows. The tari¤ reduction that country k receives from country i under hfij; ikgi removes the disadvantage it faces relative to country j while exporting to country i's market under hfijgi. However, to achieve equal footing with country j in country i's market, country k has to grant preferential access to country i in its hitherto fully protected market. Thus, country k's preference among regimes hfijgi and hfij; ikgi is ambiguous in general.
Condition 2:
i.e. if condition 2 holds, each country is better o¤ as a member of a bilateral FTA relative to free trade -i.e. two countries …nd it bene…cial to exclude the third.
It is clear that no agreement hf gi is always a Nash equilibrium of the FTA game. Is a bilateral FTA hfijgi a Nash equilibrium too? Comparing country k's welfare under hfijgi and hf gi, we note that export pro…ts of country k are higher under hf gi relative to hfijgi (i.e. ki (t; t) > ki (t; 0) and kj (t; t) > kj (t; 0)) whereas its domestic surplus under the two regimes is the same (i.e. s k (ij) = s k ( ) = S k (t; t)). Therefore, we have the following result:
Lemma 2: A bilateral FTA between countries i and j makes country k worse o¤ relative to no agreement:
Since world welfare is higher under hfijgi relative to hf gi, the above inequality implies that the sum of countries i and j's welfare must surely be higher under hfijgi:
Since countries i and j are symmetric, we must have
Hence, a member country of a bilateral FTA has no incentive to deviate to no agreement and a bilateral FTA hfijgi is indeed a Nash equilibrium of the FTA game.
Is a hub and spoke arrangement such as hfij; ikgi a Nash equilibrium?
Before addressing this question we note that
The logic behind this inequality is as follows. Starting at free trade, if country k revokes its FTA with country j, export pro…ts of country i increase in both markets because its rival exporters face tari¤s whereas it itself does not: ij (0; t) > ij (0; 0) and ik (0; t) > ik (0; 0). Furthermore, the domestic surplus of country i does not change relative to free trade since its own tari¤ equals zero under both regimes: s i (ij; ik) = s i (F ) = S i (0; 0). As a result, country i's welfare under hfij; ikgi is higher than that under hfF gi.
Furthermore, we assert that w j (ij; ik) < w j (ij): the move from hfijgi to hfij; ikgi makes country j worse o¤ since it loses its preferential status in country i's market. Next, note from Lemma 1 that ww(ij; ik) > ww(ij). As a result, either country i or country k or both of them are better o¤ under hfij; ikgi relative to hfijgi. Given the fact that the hub country's welfare under hfij; ikgi exceeds even that under free trade (see 19) , we make the following assumption:
Assumption 3: The hub country of a pair of independent FTAs enjoys higher welfare than a member country of a single FTA:
We are now ready to investigate whether hfij; ikgi is a Nash equilibrium.
Three possible unilateral deviations from hfij; ikgi need to be considered:
UP1: Country i's deviation from hfij; ikgi to hf gi.
UP2: Country i's deviation from hfij; ikgi to hfijgi (or hfikgi). Is free trade also a Nash equilibrium of the FTA game? To be able to answer this question in the a¢rmative, we need to rule out the following two deviations:
UF1: Country k's deviation from hfF gi to hfijgi.
UF2: Country k's deviation from hfF gi to hfij; ikgi (or hfij; jkgi).
Inequalities (13) and (16) imply that deviation UF1 cannot occur:
Furthermore, deviation UF2 can be ruled out due to the following result:
Lemma 3: Under the pair of independent bilateral FTAs hfij; ikgi, each spoke country (i.e. j and k) is worse o¤ relative to free trade.
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The logic behind this result is as follows. Since world welfare is lower under hfij; ikgi relative to free trade hfF gi whereas the welfare of the hub country is higher (see inequality 19) , the sum of the welfare of the two spoke countries (i.e. j and k) must be lower than that under free trade. Since both are symmetric, it follows that both must be worse o¤ under hfij; ikgi relative to free trade hfF gi:
The following proposition summarizes the Nash equilibria of the FTA game: 
Stable Nash equilibria
We begin with the No FTA game. Recall from Proposition 1 that the No FTA game admits two Nash equilibria: hf gi and hfF gi. Which, if any, of these is stable? It is easy to see that all three countries have a joint incentive to deviate from hf gi to hfF gi -each is better o¤ under free trade than under no agreement. Based on the de…nition of a stable Nash equilibrium, hf gi fails to be stable if the initial deviation from hf gi to hfF gi is selfenforcing -i.e. no country or a pair of countries has an incentive to further deviate from hfF gi. This indeed is the case because any such deviation (unilateral or coalitional) reverts the world back to status quo under which everyone is worse o¤. As a result, we have the following: Given these results, it is natural to ask whether a di¤erent role for FTAs might emerge when countries are not necessarily symmetric (say with respect to their costs of production of good x). For example, is it possible that in the absence of symmetry, two countries are willing to enter into a bilateral FTA but unwilling to engage in multilateral free trade? Even more interestingly, can the option to form bilateral FTAs facilitate the obtainment of multilateral free trade? We now turn to these questions.
FTAs among asymmetric countries
From hereon, we drop the assumption that the production cost of good x is equal across countries. It proves instructive to focus on the case where two countries have symmetric and low costs relative to the third. Accordingly, throughout the analysis under asymmetry, let a = b = 0 and c = > 0.
Note also that Lemma 1 requires a slight modi…cation: trade liberalization necessarily improves world welfare under asymmetry as long as it is not biased against low cost producers. In other words we know the following: 13 ww(F ) > ww(ab; ac) > ww(ab) > maxfww( ); ww(ac)g
Intuitively, a bilateral FTA between a low cost and a high cost country has two con ‡icting e¤ects on world welfare. On the one hand, it increases world welfare by raising the aggregate output of good x. On the other hand, it diverts production away from a low cost source to a high cost one and this adverse allocation e¤ect harms world welfare. The proof of Lemma 1 can be modi…ed to show that as long as the asymmetry between countries is not too high, an FTA between a high and low cost country also increases world welfare (since the allocation distortion is mild in such circumstances).
We begin with the No FTA game and …rst show that under cost asymmetry global free trade may fail to obtain even when countries are not free to form bilateral FTAs.
Feasibility of free trade
Consider the perspective of the two low cost countries (denoted by i = a; b).
From proposition 1 we know that under symmetry, the welfare of country a low cost under free trade hfF gi is higher than that under no agreement hf gi:
Assumption 2 implies:
i.e. the higher the cost of country k, the larger the gains of multilateral trade liberalization for the low cost countries.
Inequalities (24) and (25) together imply that the two low cost countries have no incentive (joint or unilateral) to deviate from free trade to no agreement:
Next, consider the high cost country's (i.e. c's) perspective. De…ne P to be the prohibitive cost level at which the export pro…ts of country c under free trade equal zero in each foreign market:
Since domestic surplus of each country is higher under no agreement hf gi than under free trade hfF gi the following is immediate:
Inequalities (24), (28) , and assumption 2 imply that there exists a critical threshold cost level ( ) such that:
Intuitively, opening up its market is unattractive to the high cost country
when it stands to gain very little (or nothing) from foreign trade liberalization. Thus, the following obtains under asymmetry: Thus, global free trade fails to be a stable equilibrium even when countries lack the option to form bilateral FTAs as long as one of them is su¢ciently high cost relative to the others (i.e. > ). Recall from Proposition 3 that under symmetry free trade is uniquely stable under the No FTA game and when such is the case, FTAs can only act as stumbling blocs. Is this also true when countries are asymmetric? We now show that this is not so.
FTAs as strong building blocs
In this sub-section we show that the option to form bilateral FTAs can serve as strong building blocs -there exists circumstances where free trade is stable under the FTA game whereas it is not so under the No FTA game.
Intuitively, this result obtains since the high cost country prefers no agreement to free trade which in turn it prefers to a bilateral FTA between the other two countries:
The key point is that under a purely multilateral approach, the high cost country can ensure the preser- Given this result, it is clear that the viability of free trade depends critically upon the preferences of the high cost country. Following the de…nition of (in 29) let r de…ne the critical threshold cost level below which the high cost country prefers free trade to regime r:
where r = fhf gi; hfabgi; hfacgi; hfbcgi; hfab; acgi; or hfab; bcgig. Arguments analogous to those that underlie the existence of ensure that these critical cost thresholds also exist for the other trade policy regimes. 15 We know from (16) that the high cost country always prefers no agreement to being a non-member: w c ( ) > w c (ab). This is because its export pro…ts are always higher under no agreement hf gi relative to the bilateral FTA hfabgi while its domestic surplus under the two regimes is the same.
As a result, we must have w c ( F ) > w c (ab F ) which implies that the critical cost threshold ( ) at which w c ( F ) = 0 is smaller than the one ( ab ) where w c (ab F ) = 0:
Similarly, by de…nition, the high cost country has an incentive to unilaterally deviate from free trade hfF gi to hfab; acgi i¤ > ab;ac . 16 Before proceeding further, it is convenient to write down a condition analogous to condition 1:
Condition 1A:
Note that condition 1A is equivalent to ab < ab;ac and if it holds then the hub and poke arrangement hfab; acgi cannot be an equilibrium since country c prefers being a non-member to being a spoke. We can now state: Proposition 5 and 7 together imply the following:
Corollary 1: If condition 1A holds, FTAs act as strong building blocs whenever < < ab .
The above result hinges on the insight that when free trade is not feasible due to the reluctance of the high cost country, the fact that the low cost countries can form a bilateral FTA can make it a willing participant in global free trade since it is worse o¤ as a non-member country than it is under free trade. It is worth noting here that Baldwin (1995) argued that the expansion of a regional trade bloc can induce outsiders to join since their export pro…ts su¤er if they stay outside. In our model, a similar logic operates but there are several important di¤erences. First, our logic does not rely on the presence of economies of scale. Second, the formation of FTAs is fully endogenous in our approach. Third, and more importantly, our model highlights the fact that under a purely multilateral approach, a country that is reluctant to liberalize can e¤ectively prevent liberalization between its trading partners and the removal of such 'veto power' can sometimes be necessary to achieve global free trade. We next provide a graphical illustration of our main results under asymmetry using linear demand. 
Appendix
Trade liberalization increases welfare Di¤erentiating world welfare with respect to t gives:
Using u 0 = p i and x i = x ii + X z6 =i
x zi , we have
Also note that
where we have made use of the …rst order conditions for pro…t maximization for each …rm. From equations (34) through (36) we have:
Using
x zi , the following is immediate:
i.e. lowering tari¤ improves world welfare. Analogous arguments establish that (i) the lowering of its tari¤ on an MFN basis must also improve world welfare and that (ii) it is socially optimal to set an FTA's external tari¤ to zero.
When countries are asymmetric, trade liberalization increases welfare so long as it increases the aggregate output of good x. Only when liberalization is biased in favor of a high cost country can it be the case that dx i dt > 0.
Proof of Proposition 6
First consider country a's unilateral deviation from hfF gi to hfbcgi. The following is immediate from (21):
From assumption 2 we know @ [w a (bc) w a (F )] @ < 0 (40) Inequalities (39) and (40) together imply that w a (bc) < w a (F ) for all (41)
Since a = b = 0, starting at free trade, neither country a nor b has an incentive to unilaterally break any of its FTAs. Recall from (26) that low cost countries have no incentives to unilaterally or jointly deviate from hfF gi to hf gi. We now rule out deviations of country a from hfF gi to hfab; bcgi. It is immediate from (22) As a result, a low cost country has no incentive to unilaterally deviate from hfF gi to hfab; bcgi. This also implies that countries a and c have no incentive to jointly deviate from free trade hfF gi to hfab; bcgi.
Next, consider country a's deviation from free trade hfF gi to hfac; bcgi. We know from (23) that ww(F ) > ww(ac; bc). Also, w c (F ) < w c (ac; bc). This implies that countries a and b must both be worse o¤ under hfac; bcgi relative to hfF gi w a (ac; bc) = w b (ac; bc) < w a (F )
Therefore, there exist no unilateral or joint deviations from hfF gi to hfac; bcgi. Thus, all feasible coalitional deviations have been ruled out except for the following: (JD1): joint deviation of countries a and b from hfF gi to hfabgi.
(JD2): joint deviation of countries a and c from hfF gi to hfacgi.
From assumption 3 we know that, even if these two deviations were to occur, taking countries b and c's announcements as …xed, country a has an incentive to further deviate from from hfabgi in JD1 (or hfacgi in JD2) to hfab; acgi. Therefore, neither JD1 nor JD2 is self-enforcing.
Proof of Proposition 7
Proposition 6 states that countries a and b will not deviate from free trade either unilaterally or jointly. To prove that free trade is stable if ab we only need to rule out unilateral deviations on the part of country c. First note that if ab then country c will not break both FTAs and become a non-member. Second, it has no incentive to break one of its FTAs and become a spoke under a hub and spoke arrangement (Lemma 3). Now we show that hfabgi is stable when > ab . Since
countries a and b have no unilateral or coalitional incentive to deviate from hfabgi to hf gi. We now consider self-enforcing coalitional deviations from hfabgi. Since condition 1 holds for all , country c has no incentive to jointly deviate with country a (or b) from hfabgi to hfab; acgi (or hfab; bcgi). Next, note that the joint deviation of all countries from hfabgi to hfac; bcgi is not selfenforcing because countries a and b have a joint incentive to further deviate from hfac; bcgi to hfF gi. Furthermore, when > ab country c has no incentive to jointly deviate with country a and b from hfabgi to hfF gi. Finally, suppose that countries a and c have an incentive to jointly deviate from hfabgi to hfacgi. It is immediate from assumption 3 that country a wants to further deviate from hfacgi to hfab; acgi. As a result, the initial deviation from hfabgi to hfacgi is not self-enforcing and hfabgi is stable.
Proof of Proposition 8
The …rst statement of Proposition 8 is immediate from Proposition 6 and the de…nition of ab;ac . Consider the second part. If ab;ac < country c has no incentive to deviate jointly with country b from hfab; acgi to hfF gi. Also, if condition 1A fails then country c has no incentive to deviate (either unilaterally or jointly with a) from hfab; acgi to hfabgi. Moreover, a simple extension of assumption 3 to asymmetry implies that country a has no incentive to deviate from hfab; acgi to hfabgi or hfacgi: w a (ab) w a (ab; ac) w a (ac) w a (ab; ac) < 0 for all (47) Inequalities (47) and w a (ab) > w a ( ) imply that country a has no incentive to deviate from hfab; acgi to hf gi. Now consider the joint deviation of countries b and c from hfab; acgi to hf gi. Note that even if this deviation occurs, taking a's announcement as given, b has an incentive to deviate further from hf gi to hfabgi. As a result, the initial deviation is not selfenforcing. The only remaining possible deviation is the joint deviation of countries b and c from hfab; acgi to hfac; bcgi. However, this deviation is not self enforcing since country b has an incentive to further deviate from hfac; bcgi to hfF gi. As a result, if ab;ac < the pair of bilateral FTAs hfab; acgi is stable. 
